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Addison Muellert
The average consumer' who buys one of today's more complicated
products may find that his experience is not as happy as he and his
family had anticipated. For due in part to the ever increasing sophisti-
cation of such goods, in part to production pressures, in part to price
competition, and in part to a lack of enough highly skilled labor to
meet the ever-increasing demand, there is a fair chance that his newly
delivered color TV, or stereo equipment, or dishwasher, or car won't
work.2 It probably won't explode, or cut him, or electrocute him-
nothing that dramatic. It will just have something wrong with it. The
consumer may then discover that getting the difficulty taken care of
is a time consuming and maddening experience. 3 He may, in short,
discover that frustration-not satisfaction-is his lot.
As things stand today, there is precious little beyond persisting and
enduring that the average consumer can do about a defective product.4
Since in all probability he will have paid for his purchase in advance
-either by making a down payment and signing negotiable paper for
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1. Sales law lacks a satisfactory definition of the term "consumer." Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter cited as UCC] does not attempt a definition.
UCC § 9-109 says that goods are "'consumer goods' if they are used or bought for use
primarily for personal, family or household purposes." (See also the definition of a "con-
sumer credit sale" in § 2.104 of the proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code.) As the
draftsmen of the UCC admit in § 9-109, Comment 2, cases like that of the physician's
car or the farmer's jeep are hard to classify under its definition. Because I want to cover
not only such buyers but also such even more troublesome cases as the carpenter's
electric saw and the architect's electric pencil sharpener, I have settled for the following
statement which will, I believe, adequately convey my intention: By consumer I mean
a buyer of a small lot from a retailer.
2. The situation in the automobile industry is neatly summarized by the following
statement of Paul F. Lorenz, Ford Motor Company vice-president, in his testimony before
the Federal Trade Commission on January 10, 1969: "The roots of today's service
problem lie in a rapidly growing vehicle population of enormously increased complexity
that has outstripped the resources of the auto-repair industry." Wall Street journal, Tan.
19, 1969, at 4, col. 3. The situation in the appliance indusry is no different. See Wall
Street Journal, Sept. 25, 1968, at 1, col. 1.
3. See generally REPORT OF PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE INVESTIGATING APPLIANCE REPAIR
AND WARRANTIES (1969).
4. For an excellent and highly readable description of a hypothetical consumer's
futile efforts to get something done about a defective product, see Comment, Translating
Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective Programs for Protection, 114 U. PA.
L. REV. 395, 397-403 (1966). For an equally readable but tongue-in-cheek description of
the same problem, see Buchwald, There's One Thing that's Absolutely Guaranteed, L.A.
Times, Jan. 14, 1969, § 2, at 9, col. 1.
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the balance,5 or by using a bank or other outside-dealer credit card
which equally deprives him of defenses to payment of the charge0-
he does not have the "try and collect" muscle of the increasingly rare
individual who buys on open account.7 Extralegal institutional sanc-
tions based on the importance of maintaining reputation in well orga-
nized markets, so helpful to many businessman buyers, are beyond
him because consumer buying power is impressive only in the mass.8
Self help (the most tempting of all measures as frustration builds) is
a method that society cannot tolerate.9 And the law-which is all he
has left-is of almost no use whatever. So he sends, or takes, his
problem-plagued purchase back to the factory or to the local service
center or to the dealer again and again and again until it is finally
fixed or until he gives up in disgust.10
5. The dealer almost invariably "discounts" this paper, i.e., negotiates it to a financing
agency and thus keeps his capital available. He also thus cuts off stop-pa)ment pressure
from his customer, because the negotiatee will claim as a holder in due course who
takes the note free of the purchaser's claims that the goods he purchased are defective.
See UCC §§ 3-302 to -305. Such discounting has come under increasing judicial scrutiny,
and to the extent that it is not with arm's length financing agencies or is otherwise notin good faith, its normal cut-off effect is denied. Unio v. Owen. 50 N.J. 101. 232 A.2d
405 (1967); Murphy, "Another Assault Upon the Citadel": Limiting the Use of Negotia-
ble Notes and Waiver-of-Defense Clauses in Consumer Sales, 29 Ouiso Sr. L.J. 667 (196).6. Typical of the language carried on bank and similar credit cards is this from theBank of America's Bank Americard: "Holder agrees . . . (6) to waive and release Bankfrom all defenses, rights and claims holder may have against any merchant or company
honoring the Bank Americard." As Davenport points out, however. "An unreasonably
high percentage of cardholder complaints against a merchant member would be a fact of
commercial life which an issuer in its own self-interest could not, and would not. disre-gard." Bank Credit Cards and the Uniform Commercial Code, I VALPAmaisO L. Rnv. 218,
243 (1967). See also Bergsten, Credit Cards-A Prelude to the Cashless Society, 8 B.C. IND.& Comr. L. Raw. 485, 509-516 (1967).
7. Even the buyer on open account may be deterred by concern lest his credit
rating suffer if he lets his debt to his dealer show as too long past due on the records
of the local credit rating bureaus. It is hard to exjplain to the colossus that credit
bureaus have become why a particular delinquency is justified. The growing use of com-puters not only to store credit information but to assign credit ratings automatically
makes the prospect even more disturbing. See Karst, "The Files": Legals Controls Over
the Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored Personal Data, 31 LAw & CoN.'-aip. Pnon. 342,
359-63, 371-76 (1966).
8. Word gets around in a trade organization if a supplier (or a customer, for that
matter) is unreasonably uncooperative. Even without that clout, however, the individual
small merchant has some muscle of his own developed through the continuing nature ofhis relationship with his supplier. A similar close and continuing relationship between
customer and dealer still exists to a limited extent in our small towns, where the per-
sonal nature of trading encourages dealer-customer cooperation. In our larger cities,however, the picture is now largely one of impersonalization. This is the age of the
supermarket on the one hand and of rootless families on the other. Thus, though
dealers are interested in maintaining goodwill, it is goodwill in the abstract that con-
cerns them. It is difficult to become too concerned over the loss of a customer who is
merely a here-today-and-gone-tomorrow face in the crowd.
9. Perhaps one of the few amusing incidents of self-help was related by columnist
Matt Weinstock (L.A. Times, Aug. 5, 1968, § 2, at 6) about what may have been a dis-gruntled car buyer who apparently used a slingshot to catapult large rocks onto a used
car lot. (It was not, however, amusing to the dealer.)
10. The standard warranty usually limits the consumer's remedy to repair or replace-
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Perhaps the endurance of substantial frustration is part of the price
that today's consumer expects and is willing to pay for his purchase.
Perhaps-willing or not-he must grin and bear it for the general
economic good. Perhaps the problem is of insufficient importance to
justify concern."1 But there is good reason to doubt all of these prem-
ises, especially as the problem moves down to the bottom rungs of the
economic and social ladder and there joins such merchandising evils
as over-pricing, over-selling, loaded financing charges, and misrep-
resentation.12 To the extent that existing legal remedies are either un-
available or insufficient, we have an important job of law creating
to do.
Two factors combine to bring about the modern consumer's lack
of effective legal power when be buys a product which is faulty but
does not cause physical injury. Both of them stem from the fact that
he is a little man in the scheme of things. First, there is an all-per-
vasive difficulty: our machinery of justice is simply not designed for
easy use by the average citizen with a minor claim of any kind. If
anything, it is designed to discourage him. He is not apt to know a
lawyer and he does not particularly want to know one.'5 And if he
does muster up his courage and finds a lawyer, he will almost surely
discover that his small claim is of no interest to that lawyer unless he
is prepared to guarantee what to him will seem a preposterous sum.
1 4
ment of defective parts at the manufacturer's plant or at an approved service station.
This limitation on where the consumer must present the defective product can be both
time consuming and expensive, since he must bear the costs of packaging and of ship-
ping the defective product to the plant. Often the consumer will not bother to enforce
the warranty because of the bother and expense involved. See Comment, The Card War-
ranty and Consumer Sales, 2 VAL'ARAIso L. Rxv. 358, 370 (1968).
11. It is not every slight inconvenience that requires redress. Nor do most people
look for it. They are, in fact, conditioned to expect a reasonable amount of frustration
in the complicated business of living today. See Perry, Inability Grows to Accomplish
Simple Things, The National Observer, June 17, 1968, at 1, col. 1. It is the acelerating
addition of substantial doses of helplessness in situations where the individual feels that
he is being victimized that is a cause for concern. It is with frustration of this quantity
and quality in the sale of goods area that this paper is concerned.
12. See D. CAPLOVITz, THE POOR PAY MORE (1963), P. WALD, LAW AND POVERTY
passim (1965); Carlin & Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12 U.C.L.A.L.
REV. 381, 402-07 (1968); Comment, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745(1967); Note, Installment Sales, Plight of the Low-Income Buyer, 2 COLUA. J.L. &
Soc. PRoB. 1 (1966).
13. [I]t seems to me that at bottom of the popular hatred of lawyers Is the
black cloud in which the lawyers operate. It is a darkness compounded of an un-
known language, intricate procedures, esoteric learning, and the trouble that oc-
casions their presence. The layman approaches the lawyer reluctantly: it is strange:
it may bite; it usually does.
Mellinkoff, Review, 15 U.C.LA.L. REV. 1075, 1076 (1968).
14. Bar Association suggested fee schedules generally get a minimum hourly rate of
from $15 to $20 for consultation, and few urban lawyers charge less. Carter, Eihics and
Economics in Hourly Fees, 50 A.B.AJ. 951 (1964). Thus if the lawyer follows such advice
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Even in those localities where small claims courts are supposed to be
readily available, the use of the law remains a mysterious and a
frightening prospect for the average citizen. It is especially frightening
for the below-average citizen, for "the poor man looks upon the law
as an enemy, not as a friend. For him the law is always taking some-
thing away."'
5
The unavailability of simple process handicaps the little man re-
gardless of the nature of his small claim, and it is handicap enough.
But when he claims as a consumer against a seller, he encounters a
second difficulty. Unless his claim is based on accidental injury to
person or property caused by a defective product and is thus eligible
for relief in tort, he claims in contract and must use a deck of doctrine
that is stacked against him.
Most of his losing cards are colored "freedom of contract." Contract
(says the jurisprudence) is a voluntary association, and the parties are
therefore free within broad limits to adopt such terms as they see fit.10
The reasonably equal bargaining power that is manifestly required
to support this basic principle is presumed 7 as is the fact that parties
to a written agreement know, or ought to know, the terms of their
agreement.'8 The ultimate consumer faced with a defective appliance
or product, is almost sure to find that his seller has taken full ad-
vantage of these presumptions. He will discover that the printed con-
tract that he "made" with his dealer contained one or more variously
labeled terms and conditions designed by lawyers to give the dealer
and everyone above him in the distribution pipeline maximum pro-
as that of the California Law Office Handbook to alert the client to the probable cost ofhis services at the outset, the matter will probably end right there. As the Handbook(with its customary leave-no-stone-unturned completeness) says: "Even a wealthy client
may not insist on the enforcement of a right of action if a reasonable fee would makethe recovery uneconomical." CALIFoRNIA CoNnruiNG EDuCATio. OF "M BAP. uaWoNIALAw OrFicE HANDBooK 599 (1962). The presence in many communities of Legal Aid Of.fices eliminates most of the cost problem for the informed indigent; in this respect, atleast, he is better off than the more affluent consumer. But see Comment, TranslatingSympathy For Deceived Consumers Into Effective Programs For Protection, 114 U. PA. L.
REv. S95, 409-10 (1966).
15. Address by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy on Law Day. University ofChicago, May 1, 1964. See P. WIA.D, LAw AND PovRTrY ch. 3 (1965).
16. The law will not make a better contract for the parties than they themselveshave seen fit to enter into, or alter it for the benefit of one party and to the detri-
ment of the other. The judicial function of a court of law is to enforce a contract
as it is written.Gummere, C.J., in Kupfersmith v. Delaware Ins. Co., 84 N.J.L. 271, 275; 86 A. 399, 401(1913).
17. Perhaps the neatest, though oblique, expression of this presumption is the "rule"that the law will not question the adequacy of consideration. The presumption is, of
course, rebuttable. See 1 A. CoRmN, ComrRA ers § 127, at 541 (1964).
18. See 3 A. ComRm, Co rmAcrs § 607, at 656 (1964).
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tection against consumer claims. He has, in short, entered into what
we have come to call a contract of adhesion. Professor Patterson, who
coined the phrase in 1919 in an article discussing life insurance
policies, described such a contract as one "drawn up by the insurer,
and the insured, who merely 'adheres' to it, has little choice as to its
terms."'19 In less elegant but no less accurate language, a contract of
adhesion is a contract that sticks the helpless consumer with standard
form clauses that he might not have agreed to if he had actually had
free choice.
Some of this printed boilerplate is apt to come in an envelope con-
taining assorted other literature that is sealed in the carton or is taped
to the chassis of the purchased equipment. In consequence it is seldom
seen by the buyer until after delivery. Clearly, then, the buyer might
persuasively claim that he cannot be bound by it because he never
accepted it as part of his bargain.20 But it would make little practical
difference if he not only saw it but read it and even understood it
before his purchase. The result of an attempt on his part to reject it
would be no purchase; it would be a rare and imaginative dealer in-
deed (to say nothing of a rare and imaginative customer) who would
act in so non-institutional a fashion as to agree to a special warranty
arrangement. Even if a dealer were willing to do so, his action would
almost surely be held not to have involved the deeper pockets of his
supplier or the manufacturer of the product.21 And though theo-
retically the buyer could go elsewhere and buy from a merchant who
did not so limit his obligations, he would almost certainly find that
all competing goods were similarly limited.22 So to turn the matter on
19. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy, 33 IARv. L. REv. 198, 222
(1919). See also Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts about Freedom of Con-
tract, 43 COLUMi. L. REv. 629 (1943); Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflicts of
Laws, 53 CoLum. L. Ra v. 1072 (1953).
20. See Note, The Card Warranty and Consumer Sales, 2 VAUARAtso L. REv. 
358
(1968).
21. Manufacturers' warranties usually state explicitly that a dealer is not authorized
to alter or make additional warranties on behalf of the manufacturer, Such limitations
should at least be given effect against a claim over by a dealer who is held to such
altered or additional obligation by his customer. Whether a consumer should be entitled
to claim directly against the manufacturer in such a case depends on whether an agency
relationship (express or apparent) can reasonably be spelled out. The problem ties into
that arising when a dealer warrants that a product is fit for a use not reasonably en.
compassed by the nature of the product. In such a case, a remote seller's defense of no
privity to a consumer claim based on product failure under the stress of such special use
makes some sense.
22. The clause limiting remedy to repair or replacement is now as much a fixture In
business literature as those old friends the force majeure clause, the offer subject to vprior
sale and acceptance clause, standard invocations of the parol evidence rule, and "very
truly yours." The feeling about them is that they-like so much contractual language-
can do no harm and might do some good.
580
Vol. 78: 576, 1969
Contracts of Frustration
the buyer's lack of knowledge would simply put dealers to the useless
task of saying, "Look at this," before they say, "Sign here." A require-
ment that full disclosure be made concerning terms that can in fact
be accepted or rejected is a meaningful and important element of
contract law. But standard disclaimers and limitation of remedy
clauses 3 such as make up the bulk of the printed boilerplate in con-
tracts for the sale of consumer goods are not such choice-offering
terms. The problem with such clauses is not lack of notice but lack
of consumer power to bargain about them. The problem is that they
are parts of contracts of adhesion.
The most common liability-limiting clause in the modern con-
sumer's contract of adhesion will be reassuringly labeled "Warranty"
or "Guarantee." It will read something like this:
This product is precision built, inspected and tested before
leaving our factory. It is guaranteed against defects in materials
and workmanship for one year, cord set and plastic container
excluded. If found defective it must promptly be returned post-
paid to the factory or an authorized service station, not to the
dealer, and it will be repaired without charge. It is expressly
agreed that our total liability is limited to such repair. If used
according to instructions, it should give years of satisfactory ser-
vice.24
This clause comes in a variety of shapes and sizes, but all models
are designed to accomplish the same end. The idea is to salvage as
much protection as possible from the wreckage of the now discredited
"no warranties express or implied" clause, by which yesteryear's
lawyers attempted to avoid even the obligation to deliver merchant-
able goods.2 5 As an example of skillful legal drafting to that end, the
repair and replacement clause is a superb product. For by generously
admitting a sole (and minimal) obligation to keep trying until the
23. Broad disclaimers of warranty are frowned upon by the UCC; limitations of
remedy, on the other hand, are encouraged. Compare UCc § 2-316 (exclusion or modifi-
cation of warranties) with §§ 2-718 (liquidation or limitation of damages) and 2-719 (con-
tractual modification or limitation of remedy).
24. Warranty, Rival Blender Model #944. Rival Manufacturing Co., Kansas City, Mo.
(1968).
25. UCC § 2-316 makes the present futility of such a catch-all attempt clear without
denying a seller the opportunity to negotiate an "as is" sale in a case where sucl a zole
makes commercial sense. As Comment I to the Section explains,
This section is designed principally to deal with those frequent clauses in sales con-
tracts which seek to exclude "all warranties, express or implied." It seeks to protect
a buyer from unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer by denying effect
to such language when inconsistent with language of express warranty and permit-
ting the exclusion of implied warranties only by conspicuous language or other
circumstances which protect the buyer from surprise.
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promised defect-free product is delivered, it continues to deny-either
expressly or by necessary implication-all other responsibility. And it
does all of this in a virtuous and reassuring tone that is much ap-
preciated by sales managers.
If the language of this "guarantee" to repair or replace means what
it says, what a consumer really buys from his dealer is not a properly
operating color TV, stereo, dishwasher, or car. He buys a promised
opportunity to get one sooner or later if in the meantime he co-
operates with the manufacturer-wholesaler-dealer establishment. In
effect, he not only has the role of final inspector in the production
process, but is also expected to take all risks and bear all expenses in-
volved in making that inspection.
The clause has not, of course, been permitted to provide all of the
protection it seems to call for. It is no more effective in insulating a
seller from liability for physical injury caused by a dangerously de-
fective product than was the sweeping language of its predecessor, the
general disclaimer. The tortious road from caveat emptor to caveat
venditor in such cases is too well marked 20 to allow such frivolous
strayings as permitting a seller whose customer has been electrocuted
by a defective power saw to discharge his obligation by tendering a
replacement to the executor of the customer's estate. Any lingering
doubts which might have remained on this score in some contract-
conscious jurisdictions have been laid to rest by the sweeping adoption
of the Uniform Commercial Code with its provision in Section 2-719
that a limitation or exclusion of consequential damages for injury to
the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable
and of no effect.27 So although a repair and replacement clause tucked
26. The literature in the legal periodicals is overwhelming. Some of the more fre.
quently cited articles are Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 STAN. L.
REv. 1077 (1965); Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in
Defective-Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REv. 974 (1966); Gillam, Products Liability in a
Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. REv. 119 (1958); James, Products Liability, 34 TExAs L. REV. 44
(1955); Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of
a Defect, 41 TEXAS L. REv. 855 (1963); Kessler, Products Liability, 76 YALE L.J. 887 (1967);
Kessler, The Protection of the Consumer Under Modern Sales Law, 74 YALE L.J. 22
(1964); Lascher, Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products: The Road To and Past
Vandermark, 38 S. CAL. L. Rv. 30 (1965); Noel, Manufacturers o/ Products-The Drift
Toward Strict Liability, 24 TENN. L. REv. 963 (1957); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966); Prosser, The Assault upon
the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Shanker, Strict Tort
Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial Code: A Commentary on
Jurisprudential Eclipses, Pigeonholes and Communications Barriers, 17 W. RES. L, Rv.
5 (1965); Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability,
32 TENN. L. Rv. 363 (1965).
27. UCO § 2-719(3) reads as follows:
Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or ex-
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away in the seller's literature may make the consumer serve as the
final inspector in the manufacturing process, at least he does not bear
the risks of physical injury during the "inspection," no matter what
such a clause may say.
The effect of the clause on claims for damages to property is a little
less dear, though there is no sensible reason why the same result
should not be reached. What question there is stems from the UCC's
express exclusion of limitations of commercial damages (blithely left
undefined in the Code) from the prima facie unreasonable category
of Section 2-719. The nature of commercial damages was apparently
clear to the Code's draftsmen, but it is not all that clear to everyone
else, especially in view of the fact that only consumers (equally unde-
fined in the Code, but certainly the least commercial of buyers) are
eligible for protection to begin with.28
When we leave the area of physical injury to person or to property,
we enter a land of consequential damages that defy classification. In
contract, there is no wilder territory. The scenery ranges from the
hunter who, because of a defective rifle, loses his once-in-a-lifetime
shot at a tiger and claims the total cost of his safari to the farmer whose
crop is substantially lost because of the delivery of harvesting ma-
chinery that does not operate as it should. 0 Contract has long strug-
gled with consequential damage problems like these in all sorts of
breach situations. Theoretically, once the "avoidable consequences"
test is met by the complaining buyer, all provable damages caused by
the breach should be recoverable. 1 This, however, is a result for which
the merchant-oriented law of contract has never had much stomach,
and it has built a battery of devices upon and around the foreseeability
requirement of Hadley v. Baxendale2-- including those twins "too re-
mote" and "too speculative" 33 -to permit maximum judicial flexibility
dusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the
person in the case of consumer goods is prima fade unconscionable but limitation
of damages where the loss is commercial is not.
28. See Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Dejec-
tive-Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. RFv. 974, 994-96 (1966).
29. Thomas v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 255 Cal. App. 2d 806, 63 Cal. Rptr. 454(1967).
30. Steele v. J.1. Case Co., 197 Kan. 554, 419 P.2d 902 (1966).
31. The rule that damages that could have been avoided by reasonable action by the
non-breaching party are not recoverable (the avoidable consequences rule), is built into
the system by considering such losses as "caused" by the non-breaching party's conduct
and not by the breach.
32. 9 Exch. 341 (1854).
33. "Too remote" is the contract equivalent of tort's "proximate cause" principle
and its application is equally unpredictable. An interesting illustration of its use is
found in Newsome v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 153 N.C. 153, 69 S.X. 10 (1910).
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in handling such claims. 34 But this very flexibility has made their
shelter too leaky for sellers to rely upon without more."
It is here that the "repair and replacement only" clause comes into
its own.36 Its use does not guarantee a weatherproof shelter, because
under Section 2-719 any limitation of remedy can, under proper cir-
cumstances, be shown to be unconscionable 37 or to have failed of its
essential purpose38 and thus to be inoperative. But it certainly helps.
Without doubt it could save a judge the struggle of fitting the fore-
seeability and too speculative-too remote doctrines to such a case as
that of the father of the bride who discovers that defective film has
caused all of the pictures taken at the wedding to be blanks. The little
legend on the box of film to the effect that the sole liability of the
"Too speculative" is frequently used with "too remote" as if the whole were one word.
When used in this sense, i.e., as describing a loss not caused by the breach, there can be
no quarrel with it beyond redundancy. It has another use in contract law, however: to
characterize a damage claim that, though admittedly caused by the breach, cannot be
determined with sufficient monetary exactness to satisfy the court. It is usually invoked
where a buyer claims for lost profits because of a nondelivery. trhe degree of certainty
of loss required is steadily being relaxed, but the rule still can operate harshly to cut
off all but nominal damages in cases where, for example, the buyer is starting a new
and unusual business and cannot open as planned because of a nondelivery. See
C. McCoRuacK, DAMAGES 519-726 (1935); 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRAarS §§ 1022-23 (1964).
34. The ultimate in flexibility is provided by the addition to the foresceability rule
of the so-called "tacit agreement to assume the risk" requirement. This rule originated
in England shortly after Hadley v. Baxendale was decided, and it has subsequently been
used when convenient by some American courts. It requires not only that a party have
notice that a particular loss will follow a breach on his part, but also that the assumption
of such risk by him be within the contemplation of the parties, i.e., that he be deemed
to have assumed the position of insurer against such loss as part of his total obligation.
The possibilities for manipulation of this concept are infinite. As Professor McCormick
states in his excellent discussion of this whole topic in his treatise on damages:
It adds the fiction of a tacit promise to the original fiction of "contemplation," and
seldom is there anything in the situation more definite and mandatory than the
judge's sense of justice to tell him to find the presence or absence of this silent
promise to assume the risk. The recurrent cropping up of the idea in the opinions
of the courts indicates that some of the judges have found the conception useful
in giving expression to this sense of the justice of the situation.
C. IcCoRMIcK, DAMAGES §§ 141, 580 (1935).
The draftsmen of the UCC expressly repudiated the above rule in § 2-715, Comment
2 in the following terms: "The 'tacit agreement' test for the recovery of consequential
damages is rejected."
35. In Steele v. J.I. Case Co., for example, the plaintiff-farmer was unable to harvest
his wheat crop before rain substantially destroyed it because a combine he had recently
purchased would not work. In effect, the court held that the loss of the crop from heavy
rain if the combine proved inoperable was not unforeseeable. 197 Kan. 554, 419 P.2d 902
(1966).
36. The framers of the UCC explicitly recommend its use for purposes of avoiding
consequential damages in Section 2-715, Comment 3 with this language: "Any seller
who does not wish to take the risk of consequential damages has available the section
on contractual limitation of remedy."
37. UCC § 2-719(3).
38. UCC § 2-719(2). "Failed of its essential purpose" was not a happy choice of lan-
guage by the draftsmen. A limitation whose purpose is to cut off consequential damages
does not fail of that purpose when it does just that. One must look to Comment 1 of the
Section to understand that what was apparently meant is .. operates to deprive either
party of the substantial value of the bargain."
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manufacturer is replacement with a new film would provide a con-
venient out for the judge who was unsympathetic to the father's
claim.39
But what of strict liability in tort? Does it provide a potential basis
for recovery of consumers' damages like these? As in the case of con-
tract, tort logically should be available for such consequential damages
if available for direct injuries to person or property. Such treatment
would eliminate contract's Hadley v. Baxendale tests along with limi-
tation of remedy clauses, replacing them with such narrower escape
routes from off-beat claims as proximate cause, assumption of risk,
buyer's negligence, and lack of measurable loss.40 The prospect of this
shift frightens the wits out of sellers. It has also caused further ques-
tioning of the economic wisdom of risk-spreading over the total
market.41 Only the opening skirmish of the judicial battle over whether
or not so to extend strict liability has been fought.4 2 It promises to
be a long and bloody war, with the forces of sellers now well en-
trenched behind the express language of Section 2-719. Their position
is indeed a strong one, for to extend strict liability to all types of con-
sumer losses would seem to nullify the distinction expressly drawn in
Section 2-719(3) between "injury to the person" and "commercial"
loss.3 Only by straining to interpret the phrase "injury to the person"
to mean not personal injury but any injury suffered by a person who
qualifies as a consumer (as opposed to any injury suffered by a busi-
nessman) can the distinction be accommodated. Judicial nose-thumb-
ing at legislative intent on this scale is not easily come by. Nor does
the extension of strict liability here have the same appeal, either emo-
tional or practical, that it does in physical damage cases. The three
major reasons for using tort to win compensation for injuries to per-
son and property caused by a defective product have been (1) to take
39. If there is such a case, I have not been able to find it. This perhaps bears testi-
mony to the deterrent effect of the legend on the box. Cf. Coppola v. Kraushaar, 102
App. Div. 306, 92 N.Y.S. 436 (1905). The limitation need not, on the other hand, prevent
a sympathetic court from finding in favor of a disappointed picture taker who suffered
sizeable commerdal damage. 'Willard Van Dyke Pr. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 N.Y.2d 301.
239 N.Y.S.2d 337, 189 N.E.2d 693 (1954).
40. See Epstein, Products Liability: Defenses Based on Plaintif's Conduct, 1968 UTtII
L Rv. 267 (1968); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 460-62, 155 NAV.2d 55, 63.64 (1967).
41. See Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in De-fective Products Cases, 18 STAN. L. Rv. 974, 1004-12 (1966); Note, Economnic Loss in
Product Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L. RE%. 917, 954-58 (1966).
42. The concurrence and dissent of Peters, J., in Seely v. White Motor Co.. 63 Cal. 2d9, 19, 403 P.2d 145, 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 24 (1965) provides a map of the battle.
43. UCC § 2-719(3):
Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of con-
sumer goods is prima fade unconscionable but limitation of damages where the
loss is commercial is not.
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the easy way to avoid the privity problem and thus make the deep
pocket of the manufacturer directly available to pay the substantial
damages generally involved in claims of this type,44 (2) to avoid the
requirement of prompt notice of defect as a condition precedent to
a recognizable claim 4 -a notice frequently not thought of by legally
unsophisticated consumers, especially in the emotion-laden period fol-
lowing an accident-and (3) to cancel the effect of contractual dis-
claimer and limitation of remedy clauses.
Those needs are not pressing in the area of consequential damages
loosely labeled "commercial" or "economic." A direct dealer-consumer
relationship is primarily involved, and here there is privity aplenty.
Rarely are the damages earth-shaking in amount, so the easily available
dealer is almost invariably the prime target. And where the deep
pocket must be reached, either because the dealer is a fly-by-night
operator or is insolvent, such devices as the handy third party bene-
ficiary doctrine still have a lot of mileage left in them.40 Nor is proper
notice of defect within a reasonable time after the buyer either knows
or ought to know about the defect an important problem when a
dealer is the defendant.47 It is seldom indeed that the outraged buyer
fails to give not only prompt but also loud and persistent notice of
his complaint to the seller.
48
Another factor reducing the pressure on courts to impose strict
liability in the area of economic loss is that most such damages of any
consequence flow from persistent product failure despite a seller's at-
tempts to repair, and such cases do not require tort treatment to beat
the repair or replacement only clause. A contractual limitation of
liability to repair the defective product does not mean that a con-
sumer must put up forever with a dealer's or a service center's futile
efforts. The limitation of remedy carries in it the promise to repair,
and reading "within a reasonable time" into such a promise is stan-
dard judicial engineering. Once the dealer has made a certain number
44. See Comment, Manufacturer's Responsibility for Defective Products: Continuing
Controversy Over the Law to be Applied, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1681, 1712 (1966).
45. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 60-62, 27 Cal, Rptr. 697, 699.
700, 377 P.2d 897, 899-900 (1963).
46. For numerous ways of satisfying the privity requirement, see Gillam, Products
Liability in a Nutshell, 37 OR. L. REv. 119, 152-55 (958).
47. See Prosser, Assault on the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J.
1099, 1130 (1960).
48. This is not true of many consumers in the ghetto. See D. CALOVrTz, Tim. PooR
PAY MoRE 169-71 (1963); Hester, Deceptive Sales Practices and Form Contracts-Does the
Consumer Have a Private Remedy? 5 DuKE L.J. 831, 845-48 (1968). The difficulty here,
however, would not be significantly reduced by elimination of the notice requirement. It
goes much deeper.
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of unsuccessful attempts at cure, therefore, the promise to repair has
been breached, the protection is gone, and the dealer is liable in con-
tract for all the consequences of the breach4 01-limited again, of course,
by Hadley v. Baxendale and its relativesr0
Only one difficult problem remains if tort liability is denied in this
area of economic loss: the problem of damages caused by the initial
failure of a product. Here the dealer or the manufacturer has had no
chance to repair or replace, so he can scarcely be held accountable
for the loss because of breach of a warranty to repair. What then about
the father of the bride with his lost pictures, or the hunter with his
wasted safari, or the farmer with his lost crop? Even here the Uniform
Commercial Code reduces the need for tort liability by providing ways
to protect the consumer in cases where giving effect to the limitation's
full force would result in inequity or hardship. All that Section
2-719(3) says about commercial damages is that the application of a
limitation of remedy clause to them is not prima facie unconscionable.
The limitation can also be found to have failed of its essential pur-
pose in accordance with Section 2-719(2)."' And there is always the
catch-all unconscionability clause of Section 2-302 available in all states
but California and North Carolina.5 2
In sum, the pressures on a court to go the tort route of strict liabil-
ity for all consequential damages are not great and the difficulties in-
volved in so doing are substantial. Indeed, it can be said that the need
to protect consumers is too slight here to make the fight worth the
effort. But there is a larger need; the need for a complete reversal of
emphasis in this entire area of the law-a reversal that will make it
clear once and for all that the fiction of consumer "agreement" to
take risks of loss in routine deals has been abandoned. The use of tort
theories or of judicial interpretation of Section 2-719 are clumsy and
confusing ways to accomplish this, as recent opinions have demon-
strated.53 The dean way to do it would be to amend Section 2-719
so as to make all limitations of remedies prima facie unconscionable
in all consumer purchases of standard goods." This would recognize
49. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 13-14, 403 P.2d 145, 148, 45 Cal. Rptr.
17, 20, 403 P.2d 145, 148 (1965).
50. See pp. 583-84 & notes 35 & 36 supra.
51. See notes 39 & 40 supra.
52. BENDER's UNIFORM ComurERcIAL CODE REPORTER-DIGESr at 1-77 (1967).
53. See generally Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform
Commercial Code: A Commentary on Jurisprudential Eclipses, Pigeonholes and Comnmu.
nications Barriers, 17 W. RFs. L. R v. 5 (1965).
54. This is the philosophy of Justice Peters of the California Supreme Court as ex-
pressed in his forceful dissent in Seely:
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the fact that consumer deals for such goods are seldom commercial
transactions in the classic sense of fully negotiated bargains-that they
are contracts of adhesion and deserve special treatment as such. At the
same time it would preserve the more flexible contract damages rule
of Hadley v. Baxendale for judicial use', But the prospect of such
Code amendment in the teeth of seller and manufacturer opposition is
scarcely bright. We can expect, then, that the battle will continue to
be fought in the courts, that the dust and smoke of the contest will
grossly distort the issues, and that consumer victories will only slowly
and painfully be won.
So much for the dramatic consequential damage cases. In spite of
their importance to the development of the law, their number is in-
finitesimal compared to those simple "it just won't work" situations
that plague the modem consumer. These are the cases where the loss
is to time and to patience more than to person or to pocketbook. All
that the frustrated buyer usually wants is "out." Here the repair or
replacement limitation has its basic bite: it denies the consumer buyer
the power to terminate the sale and get his money back upon his
initial discovery of a defect rendering the product unmerchantable.
Thus, if a buyer will not permit a deliveryman to leave a defective
product in his home and promptly cancels the order, he nonetheless
remains bound to his contract."' And, of course, if the defect is not
discovered (because not discoverable) until after the appliance has
been put to use, the same result follows, although in the absence of the
repair or replace limitation the UCO denies the seller such advantages.
Section 2-608 permits the buyer to notify his seller, tender return, and
proceed to terminate as if there had been a proper rejection when the
product was first tendered, if the defect substantially impairs its value
to him.5 7
If this were all that the repair or replacement clause amounted to,
it would hardly be worth quarreling about. It would accomplish little
more than to underscore the fact that the law now looks with disfavor
The majority recognize that the rules governing warranties were developed to meet
the needs of "commercial transactions." If this is so, then why not look to the
transaction and see if it was a "commercial" transaction rather than a sale to an
ordinary consumer at the end of the marketing chain.
This approach, of course, poses the difficult problem of defining a consumer, as the
Justice recognizes; his solution is that this be done on a case-by-case basis. Seely v. White
Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 26-28, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 28-30, 403 P.2d 145, 156-58 (1965). See
note 1 supra.
55. See pp. 583-84 & notes 35 & 36 supra.
56. Wilson v. Scampoli, 228 A.2d 848 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967), noted in 52 MsN,4. L. REV.
937 (1968).
57. UCC § 2-608 (revocation of acceptance in whole or in part).
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on buyers who are quick to use an initial defective delivery as an ex-
cuse to get out of a deal that has turned out to be economically un-
desirable. That disfavor is writ large in Section 2-508, which not only
gives a seller the opportunity to "cure" an early defective delivery by
substituting a conforming tender up until the time delivery is finally
due,51 but also allows a further reasonable time (i.e., a time beyond
the delivery date) in instances where the rejection is of goods which
the seller had "reasonable grounds to believe would be acceptable with
or without a money allowance." Since final delivery date is usually a
flexible term in consumer deals and most troublesome defects in con-
sumer goods are hidden in the carton or in the product itself, it would
seem that the Code's cure provisions are neatly applicable to the
average dealer-consumer transaction.
But the repair or replacement clause, as sellers like to read it, bites
much deeper. It calls for depriving the buyer of power to terminate
for as long as a seller continues to insist on exercising his option to
make attempts to repair. And normally a seller will so insist when
goods of substantial value are involved, not only as an alternative to
cancellation but as an alternative to replacement as well. To under-
stand this insistence one must look to the set-up of the modern dis-
tribution system. For while desire to retain the sale and its profit ex-
plains a dealer's reluctance to permit a cancellation, it cannot explain
his unwillingness to replace. The answer lies in the fact that whole-
salers and manufacturers upstream from the dealer have also protected
themselves contractually from taking a faulty but repairable item
back. Therefore, the dealer who replaces is left with a piece of mer-
chandise on his hands that he has difficulty in selling at full price
because consumers are quick to suspect a product that does not have
a "factory fresh" appearance. Backed into a corner by his supplier's
refusal to replace instead of to repair, small wonder that a dealer is
equally stubborn in his treatment of a consumer.
Modem courts, as we have seen, have not let the clause give a
seller the power to make never-ending efforts to repair c0 At some
point in a series of futile attempts, the promise to repair is deemed to
have been broken, the contract is materially breached, and the buyer
acquires the power to terminate, with all remedies--including rescis-
sion--open to him. This is a significant restriction on the seller's
58. UCC § 2-508(l).
59. UCC § 2-508(2).
60. See, e.g., Cox Motor Car Co. v. Castle, 402 S.W.2d 429 (Ky. 1966). See also p. 587
supra.
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power to limit his liability by contract. But it still allows far more op-
portunity for cure than do the provisions of UCC Section 2-508. Since
that Section was designed merely to weaken the perfect tender rule, not
to destroy it61 it is hard to read even its Subsection 2 as giving sellers
more than a limited opportunity to replace promptly or to make an
effective repair-a far cry from the multiple (although less than per-
petual) repair opportunity allowed by courts under the repair or
replacement clause as a normal application of the freedom of contract
principle.62 So again we return to the fact that in consumer-dealer
contracts, standard contract philosophy is inappropriate. To say that
consumers in truth "bargain" for this sort of deal is to flout reality.
But even if all the foregoing were magically corrected by a happy
combination of legislative and judicial action, it would not be enough.
The consumer would still face the basic problem of the little man and
the law-the problem of how to use our legal machinery as an effective
sword. Here he meets obstacles that are not created by the use of con-
tractual devices but are inherent in a law of sales designed neither to
encourage little claims nor to protect the contract expectations of non-
merchants.
The law of sales was developed to meet the needs of those with a
substantial economic stake in the effective operation of agreement as
a commercial tool.68 What was called for was the maintenance of a
nice balance between not showing too much tenderness toward a con-
tract breaker on the one hand, and not exposing contracting parties
to the risk of too much loss on the other. The result for buyers is a
system that in all but the most unusual cases not only refuses to recog-
nize any form of relief other than money awarded as a substitute for
an expected performance, but also measures the amount of such sub-
stitute in terms of the value of the contract goods in the market on
or about the date of breach.6 4 Losses beyond this can be collected only
if they both (1) could not have been avoided by prompt purchase of
61. UCC § 2-601 states the perfect tender rule as the baseline doctrine introducing
buyers' rights upon breach. See also § 2-508, Comment 2. For an excellent discussion of
cure under the Code, see Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of
Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Artiele Two, 73 YAix L.J.
199, 209-16 (1963).
62. See, e.g., Marshall v. Murray Oldsmobile Co., 207 Va. 972, 154 $.E.2d 140 (1967).
63. See E. FARNSWORTH & J. HONNOLD, CASES ON COMMERCIAL LAW 3-6 (2d ed. 1968).
64. Whether the date of breach in the case of an anticipatory repudiation is the date
of repudiation or the date on which delivery should have been made is one of the
fascinating problems left unsolved (if not aggravated) by the UCC. See Peters, Remediesfor Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial
Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YA . L.J. 199, 263-67 (1963).
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a substitute in the market 5 (a rare case) and (2) could have been fore-
seen at the time the contract was made either because such loss would
be normal or because express notice of the possibility of such loss was
given by the buyer and accepted by the seller as his liability. 0 In
other words, the loss (if any) suffered by the innocent buyer when his
seller does not deliver is presumed to be a loss caused by a market
change; only in the exceptional case will it be greater than that. And
if a defective product is delivered and the buyer complains but either
neglects to reject it properly67 or elects to keep it,68 he is in effect
deemed to have bought it at its fair value, determined as a percentage
of the contract price rather than of the prevailing market price. Again,
in theory at least, the price bargain is protected. Thus contract in the
sales area is basically an arrangement by which the buyer automatically
takes an inventory position in the contract goods at the contract price
immediately upon reaching agreement, and the law protects that
position by requiring a non-performing seller to pay the buyer any
increase in the market cost of those goods. In the typical case, that's
all: no punitive damages,69 no attorney's fees,70 no consequential dam-
ages beyond the cost of effecting a substitute purchase,-' and definitely
no court supervised order to perform.72
The sanctions of this system are patently weak. Thus the highly
permissive overtones in Holmes's famous statement that a party to a
contract has the option to perform or to breach and pay damages have
practical as well as theoretical significance. 3 In fact, in the case of a
seller's wrongful refusal to deliver generally available goods in a rising
market, the arithmetic of the standard damage formula is likely
to require him to pay little more in damages than he has already
65. This is the obvious application of the avoidable consequences rule to the buyer
who does not get his expected goods. UCC § 2-712 talks about this application in terms
of "cover," and provides safeguards for the buyer who makes good faith attempts to
comply.
66. UCC § 2-715, Comment 3.
67. UCC §§ 2-602(1), 2-605, 2-606(l)(b).
68. UCc §§ 2-601(b), (c), 2-606(l)(a)(2), 2-609(3).
69. FSrATEmENT OF CoNTRACrS § 342 (1932).
70. See 1 J. BONBRIGHT, VALUATIoN OF PRoPERTY 279-80 (1937).
71. UCO §§ 2-712, 2-715.
72. UCC § 2-716(1) & Comment 2.
73. The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must
pay damages if you do not keep it-and nothing else. If you commit a tort, you
are liable to pay a compensatory sum. If you commit a contract, you are liable to
pay a compensatory sum unless the promised event comes to pass, and that is all the
difference. But such a mode of looking at the matter stinks in the nostrils of those
who think it advantageous to get as much ethics into the law as they can.
0. IV. HoLrzs, The Path of the Law, in CoLuxcra LEcAL PAP" s 167 (1920).
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gained by keeping the goods.74 In addition, the high and unrecover-
able costs of legal services and litigation discourage use of legal process
to obtain redress in cases where the claim is not substantial. But
merchants are generally content with the system for a variety of rea-
sons: (1) in their dealings with their peers, the lack of sanctions cuts
both ways; (2) by grouping small claims, as in the collection of delin-
quent accounts, a sufficiently large problem in gross is created to justify
the costs of legal proceedings; (3) the system encourages settlement,
and the process of negotiating settlement is one businessmen under-
stand and are comfortable with; and (4) the powerful extralegal sanc-
tions available in the continuing buyer-seller relationships that are
typical of most commercial contexts offer sufficient additional pro-
tection.
The significant point is that these compensating considerations do
not apply to the consumer's little one-at-a-time commercial dealings.
Hence the law's failure to provide adequate relief for small claims
that do not sensibly fit the contract-market formula is apt to mean total
denial of relief for the consumer when he is faced with a defective
product and a foot-dragging dealer. To him, contract protection
against increased market price is of only theoretical interest. His color
IV, his stereo, his dishwasher, his car are almost invariably bought
within narrow price ranges to begin with, delivery is usually close to
contract date, and no market fluctuates less wildly. When a consumer
buys, he buys to satisfy a very personal need, not to take a market posi-
tion in the item purchased. What he wants when that need is not
satisfied because the product delivered is defective is its prompt re-
placement or, failing that, prompt refund of his purchase price. When
he gets neither, to tell him that he need not worry because if he fol-
lows proper legal procedures, and if his claim is just, he may eventu-
ally be awarded judgment for a sum that will include coverage of any
loss he has suffered due to an increase in market over contract price
is to reassure him (if this can be called reassurance) on the one point
about which he is almost never concerned.
Under these circumstances, dealer concern over the prospect of
customer litigation is understandably small. The worst that can hap-
pen, practically speaking, is that the dealer may have to refund the
buyer's full price, with interest. The possibility of an award of signifi-
74. Incidental damages such as "charges, expenses or commissions in connection with
effecting cover and any other reasonable expense incident to the delay, or other breach"
which are recoverable under UCC § 2-715 are commonly not a significant item in the
case of non-delivery of goods readily available in the market.
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cant consequential damages for such a claim as lost use is remote in
the present state of the lawY Thus even if he should be stripped of
the protection of the "repair only" clause, the dealer is not apt to be
frightened into abandonment of his repair only position by threat of
a law suit, especially when he knows that the threat will rarely be
carried out once the threatening customer discovers the cost and in-
convenience involved in pressing the claim.
Consumer dissatisfaction with this state of affairs has been steadily
mounting. It adds to such other dissatisfactions as those stemming from
harsh credit terms, unreasonable and not fairly disclosed financing
costs, misleading advertising, and lack of understandable labeling.76
That the voice of this complaint is being ever more clearly raised and
ever more attentively listened to is evidenced by recent movement
toward statutes calling for full disclosure of "true" financing costs"
and providing escape hatches for victims of fast talking door-to-door
salesmen.78 But the aim of most of this activity has been to help buyers
avoid the grasp of over-reaching sellers. It has given the consumer a
variety of shields but not a single sword.7 0 Hence he still cannot fight
effectively for the full benefit of his bargain in a routine deal that has
gone sour.
Provision of the sword would require two related pieces of legal
construction. The first involves an imaginative restructuring of the
substantive law in the area of consumer sales. This restructuring must
be built upon a full recognition that few consumer deals are fully
negotiated bargains and hence that much standard contract doctrine is
not applicable. Consumers must be given a doctrinal position strong
enough to enable them to overcome the contractual defenses carefully
erected by sellers at all levels against consumer claims. Beyond that, a
simple, prompt, and direct remedy in the nature of a decree of specific
performance to replace a judgment for money damages in those cases
where the problem is simply a defective product and a dealer who does
75. See pp. 583-84 supra.
76. The daily papers are full of evidence of consumer outcry and demand. See. e.g..
Berton, Shoppers Around the World Step Up Pressure to Uncover, Eliminate Fraudulent
Practices, Wall Street Journal, July 12, 1968, at 28, col. 1; Shafer, A Breah for Buyers.
Wall Street Journal, Nov. 12, 1968, at 1. col. 6.
77. See Jordan & Warren, Disclosure of Finance Charges: A Rationale. I Micit.
L. Rv. 1285 (1966).
78. See Sher, The "Cooling-Off" Period in Door to Door Sales, 15 U.C.LA.L. Ray. 717
(1968).
79. Notable exceptions are the two bills, titled the Federal Household Appliance
Warranty Act (S. 2728, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.) and Federal Motor Vehic Safety Act (S.
2727, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.) introduced by Senators Hayden and Magnuson, each of which
provides for arbitration procedures designed to simplify the pressing of consumer claims.
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not want to replace or refund. Only such a remedy will truly protect
a consumer's expectation that he will receive a usable product without
undue delay when he buys one.
All of this might be most easily accomplished by the establishment
of a new area of law with a new name-tortract, perhaps 8 -to handle
consumer transactions. Such an approach could bypass altogether those
doctrinal and administrative impediments that up to now have made
accommodation of legal theory to the practical need so difficult. It
could, for example, deprive sellers of the power to disclaim or limit
responsibility for the delivery of merchantable standard goods without
worries about whether the liability is in tort or in contract. It could
afford sellers the protection of a reasonable opportunity to cure with-
out worries about the residue of the perfect tender requirements of
contract. It could provide damage formulae that would compensate
consumers for serious consequential damages without worries about
Hadley v. Baxendale, while protecting sellers at the same time against
far-fetched and unreasonable damage claims. And it could make
remedies akin to specific performance available for the simple "it just
won't work" cases without struggling with historical restrictions on
such relief based on the division between law and equity. It could, in
brief, permit consideration of the practical problem of consumer
frustration in terms of present realities rather than fictions desperately
maintained. However it is done, it needs doing.
Hand in hand with such doctrinal construction must go considerable
administrative engineering. For to provide remedies for minor claims
that can be obtained only at expense and trouble out of all proportion
to the amount involved and the position of the consumer is not to
provide such remedies at all. Here the solution seems to lie in the
direction already indicated by the philosophy behind small claims
courts. The fact that such courts have in too many instances fallen
short of the mark8l does not invalidate their potential if they are
properly organized, staffed, and operated. What is needed here is pro-
vision of enough such courts to make one reasonably accessible to
every citizen, with hours geared to the free time of consumers rather
than to the convenience of judges, and with proceedings dignified and
80. The argument against employing the alternative combination should be obvious.
81. While many states did set up small claims courts in response to such pleas, there
has been a growing dissatisfaction with their operation, since many credit firms are
presently using them as a form of collection agency for their claims. Carlin & Howard,
supra note 12, at 421-23; Comment, Small Claims Courts as Collection Agencies, 4 STAN. L.
REv. 237 (1952). See generally Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers
into Effective Programs for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 395 (1966).
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serious without being technical or stuffy. Whether such tribunals be
labeled consumer courts or arbitration hearings is unimportant. What
is important is that they be available, speedy, inexpensive, and fair.
In such a system, administering such law, the consumer would bear
the burden of convincing the tribunal that the sale was not "as is" (a
mere formality where new merchandise is involved), that the defect is
"in" the product and not the result of his mishandling or unreason-
able expectations or extended use, and that he has given the dealer a
fair opportunity to repair. The establishment of these facts (or failure
to do so) could be accomplished in the course of simple questioning
of both parties by a skilled fact finder. Once the facts were found, the
law and the remedy would be easy to apply: either dismissal of the
claim or an order to the dealer to refund.82 As simple as that. No dam-
ages, no costs, no penalties; in short, nothing in the process to dis-
courage consumers from bringing legitimate complaints to the tri-
bunal, but nothing in it either to encourage them to try to pick up
a few extra dollars by bringing unreasonable or trumped-up claims.
And claims against parties other than the seller directly involved
should not be permitted. Where damage is large enough to make a
claim against a remote seller advisable, the regular courts and full
process are available, as well as lawyers aplenty to handle the case on
a contingent fee basis.
82. To order replacement instead of-or as an alternative to-refund is possible but
unrealistic and probably undesirable. If a consumer-dealer dispute has to be settled bylegal process, relations between the parties will almost certainly have deteriorated to thepoint where further dealings should not be required and probably should not even be
encouraged. An order to refund or to dismiss the claim, then, is proposed as the only
ends to the process.
Admittedly an order to refund (as compared to a judgment for the refund sum) fliesin the teeth of tradition. But, for several reasons, it would nonetheless seem to be the
appropriate remedy. (1) A money judgment for the refund sum puts the burden of follow.iag a technical procedure of collection on those generally ill-equipped to bear it. It
would thus tend to defeat the very purpose for which the entire process is proposed:
the provision of a simple, inexpensive, speedy system for those now unable to cope with
"the law." (2) The traditional attitude toward the use of specific performance in all
cases where oaly the payment of money is required (money is not unique, so the remedy
at law is cearly adequate) has little beyond tradition to support it. In cases where the
money judgment is not a practical or realistic device, the remedy at law is not adequate,
and it is time that we accepted that simple truth. Most dealer-customer disputes based
on defective merchandise are such cases. (3) Concern that provision of court power to
order payment could result in major injustice to dealers is largely emotional. The
dealer who is ordered to pay can always appeal, though he should not be encouraged
to do so. If the order to refund is proper, there is no reason why he should not be
required to pay if he can. If he cannot pay, his showing of that fact when ordered to
appear before the tribunal on a non-compliance complaint obviously should save himfrom penalty. In that case, of course, the consumer will get little or nothing-precisely
what he would get if he had won a judgment against a judgment-proof defendant. If
the dealer cannot show any acceptable reason for not paying as initially ordered, it is
hard to work up much sympathy for him when the tribunal cracks down.
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It would seem that such a solution to the routine consumer com-
plaint problem would have the further virtue of placing slight addi-
tional burden on our distribution system. At first glance, without the
benefit of a full-scale study of this aspect of the problem,8 3 it is hard
to see why substituting replacement for the repair operation which
manufacturers now regularly either supply or reimburse their dealers
for should significantly increase cost. In the typical case, a proper
factory overhaul of a defective item should permit its return to normal
distribution channels as "factory fresh."84 This is certainly distinguish-
able from the situation where a dealer buys merchandise whose life
or performance have been affected by prior use and palms it off as
"new." Reputable manufacturers and reputable dealers can be trusted
not to abuse such a process; dishonest merchants would not be fur-
thered in their dishonesty by it. And once dealers know that replace-
ment or price refund is the rule in the case of truly defective mer-
chandise, the pressure they can and will exert upon their suppliers
should be enough to cause them, in turn, to cooperate with dealers
on returned goods. Direct involvement of remote suppliers in the legal
process should not be necessary to bring about such a change, for here
the environment is one of continuing relationships and significant
volume and thus competition can be expected to handle the matter.
The lack of consumer power in cases involving no great monetary
damage appears trivial in the individual case-too trivial to justify
embarking on so ambitious a program to supply it. In the mass, how-
ever, it takes on larger dimensions. For our society is becoming in-
creasingly urbanized, our population increasingly rootless, our small
neighborhood dealers replaced by supermarkets, and our communica-
83. Economists and lawyers should be devoting more time to working together in the
construction of efficient social machinery of this kind. See The Law and Econornics of
Public Policy: a Plea to the Scholars, address by Professor George Stigler, University of
Michigan, Feb. 29, 1968.
84. Acceptance of such a practice will require a substantial modification of present
Federal Trade Commission enforcement policy. The FTC now sweepingly prohibits, In
ringing and righteous tones, the marketing of "used" merchandise without disclosure of
such prior use. It bases this position on its feeling that a buyer's knowledge of the fact
of prior use is relevant to his decision as to whether or not to purchase an item, even
though the item has been refurbished to a condition as good as new. It can be conceded
that the purchasing public should not be misled into buying as new merchandise whose
life has been shortened by prior use. The matter turns on the definition of "new," as
the Commission tacitly admits when it states that "this policy applies only to merchandise
that has been used and not to merchandise that has merely been inspected but not used."
A policy designed to condition the sale of merchandise whose life or satisfactory per-
formance are impaired by previous use on disclosure of such fact is sound and sensible.
The extension of this policy to merchandise that is truly refurbished to a condition as
good (if not better) than new merely to protect a buyer's unreasonable prejudice is a
position that deserves careful re-examination. FTC Enforcement Policy, 84 Fed. Reg. 170(1969).
596
Vol. 78: 576, 1969
Contracts of Frustration
tion fouled by racial and ideological intolerances. As a result, the close
personal relationship between dealer and customer that for so long
characterized most retail trade and encouraged the amicable settle-
ment of disputes has all but disappeared in large segments of the
economy.85 With its passing, the law's long-standing indifference to the
consumer's interest in sales transactions can no longer be tolerated.
The frustrated small buyer must have some place to turn for help,
and in a well-ordered society that place should be provided by legal
institutions.8 6 If we fail to meet this need, the little man-the black,
the poor, the middle-class consumer-will have more reason than ever
to doubt that the law is for him too. There is already more of that
feeling in circulation than any society can comfortably afford.
85. See Scott, Small Causes and Poor Litigants, 9 A.B.A.J. 457 (1923).
86. See Pound, Administration of Justice in the Modern City, 26 H, v. L. Rzv. 302.
311, 315-21 (1913); Havighurst, The Courts in a Democracy, 42 IL'xois L. RMv. 567. 572-73
(1947).
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